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Salary Inversion in Business Schools: 
Does a Rising Tide Lift All Boats? 
Tom Arnold, Raymond P. H. Fishe and Adam Schwartz 
University of Richmond, University ofRichmond and Washington and Lee University 
The paper analyzes AACSB salary survey information from 1979 to 2008. 
The question addressed in this analysis is whether salary inversion is wide-
spread across the three business disciplines of accounting, economics, and 
finance. We find limited evidence of mean level inversions, which is 
concentrated in recent years. Stochastic dominance methods confirm these 
results. We also develop a measure of salary dominance based on 
comparing the distribution of reported salaries. This statistic shows a 
significant trend towards salary inversion in finance and accounting. 
INTRODUCTION 
Every year academic department chairs and deans deliberate over salary 
adjustments from limited raise pools. Generally, it is believed that business schools 
base a substantial portion of these raise adjustments on merit, as opposed to rank or 
length of service. Even so, considerations of equity are not lost in the process. In 
particular, the phenomenon of salary inversion may arise in some disciplines, which 
may task administrators to explain their decisions. Salary inversion occurs when a 
faculty member of higher rank receives a salary less than that of a faculty member 
of lower rank.1 There may be several reasons for salary inversion, such as the hiring 
of new junior faculty at more competitive current salaries or responding to outside 
offers. In these cases, salary inversion provides insight into the basic supply and 
demand conditions in the market for that discipline. As merit considerations may 
be difficult to quantify and comparisons of records and experience equally difficult 
to develop objectively, those faculty affected by salary inversion may feel wronged 
or disadvantaged by the pay raise method or hiring process. 
In an effort to provide better information to faculty and administrators, we 
investigate the extent of salary inversion in business schools accredited by the 
Association to Advance Collegiate Schools ofBusiness (AACSB). We study three 
disciplines: accounting, economics, and fmance. We use data collected by the 
AACSB in its annual salary survey. Our dataset covers the years, 1979 to 2008. 
These are aggregate data, which reveal means, medians and other selected 
distributional information on academic salaries. We fmd salary inversion at the 
mean between assistant and associate professor ranks for fmance and accounting 
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disciplines at both private and public business schools, and for economics at private 
schools. Typically, these average level inversions arise first at private schools and 
then at public schools. All of these inversions begin in the late 1990s or early 
2000s. We find no years with average level inversions between associate and full 
professors in the three business disciplines. 
We also analyze the full distribution of salaries across disciplines and ranks over 
the AACSB data. We summarize this information in terms of first- and second-
degree stochastic dominance to examine whether junior ranks dominate the more 
senior ranks. Because dominance measures compare all salaries, they provide more 
than simple summary statistics, such as the mean or median. First-degree stochastic 
dominance implies that salaries are uniformly higher across the entire distribution 
of all junior faculty members. Thus, first-degree dominance is a stronger statement 
about salary conditions between ranks than a comparison of means, and implies a 
greater burden on administrators to explain relative salary levels and adjustments. 
Note that frrst-de~ee stochastic dominance implies average-level salary inversion, 
but not vice versa. 2 
Evidence of frrst-degree stochastic dominance in any period is also likely to 
imply substantial salary changes in future periods when some junior faculty are 
promoted and move up through the ranks. LeClair (2004) makes a similar point 
while discussing the 2003-2004 AACSB salary survey: " ... most recent trends still 
hold. For instance, the inversion of salary rates-where new hires earn as much or 
more than experienced faculty-is still in place and will inevitably contribute to the 
escalation of salaries across all categories." 
We also test for second-degree stochastic dominance, when the salary 
distributions (using the cumulative distribution) cross, which negates evidence of 
frrst-degree dominance. When there is no frrst-degree dominance, second-degree 
dominance allows some salaries for faculty at senior ranks to exceed those of junior 
ranks when matched along the probability distribution of salaries. In effect, business 
schools may exhibit a spectrum of faculty quality or the results of cumulative pay 
raise procedures over a span of years, which leads to both higher and lower relative 
salaries from rank comparisons. 
Our results show only a limited number of years with stochastic dominance in 
which a junior rank dominates a senior rank. We fmd no examples of either frrst-
or second-degree dominance for associate and full professors, and only two 
instances with second-degree dominance between assistant and associate professors. 
Both instances are recent and occur in accounting and fmance disciplines. In most 
years, our results imply first- and second-degree dominance by associates over 
assistant professors. To address the potential differences between private and public 
schools, we perform separate analyses for these institutional types. 
Additionally, we develop a measure of salary dissimilarity based on the middle 
mass of the assistant and associate cumulative salary distributions. The middle mass 
is defmed as the largest area in which assistant and associate cumulative salary 
distributions overlap. This salary dissimilarity measure (SDM) examines whether 
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associate salaries are more concentrated at the lower end ofthe middle mass versus 
assistant salaries over the same salary range. If salaries are distributed equivalently 
across the middle mass, then SDM equals 100%. As assistant salaries populate the 
upper end and associates the lower end of the middle mass, the SDM measure 
decreases. We fmd that the SDM measure tends to decrease for accounting and 
finance disciplines post-1999 in both public and private schools, but tends to 
increase for economics in private schools. On net, accounting and fmance 
disciplines are moving towards greater salary dispersion between assistant and 
associate professors. 
Our research relates to recent work on salary compression in higher education 
(Toutkoushian, 1998 and Barbezat, 2004). Salary inversion is closely associated 
with salary compression, which occurs when salary differences across ranks 
decrease over time. Toutkoushian (1998) suggests that salary compression (or 
inversion) arises in institutions that have hired several new junior faculty members, 
but failed to adjust compensation levels to existing faculty members. Toutkoushian 
develops a regression procedure to estimate what junior faculty would earn if they 
were compensated according to the mechanism used for more senior faculty. 
Barbezat (2004) applies this method to two national surveys of faculty salary and 
fmds evidence of salary compression across a range of disciplines. By using the 
AACSB survey data, we also provide evidence for a national sample, although our 
methods are necessarily different because we do not observe individual faculty data. 
The outline ofthis paper is as follows. In the next section (DATA), we discuss 
the development of the AACSB salary surveys and the extent of information 
provided about salary distributions. Section three (ANALYSIS OF AVERAGES) 
investigates mean level salary inversion and documents inversion differences 
between private and public business schools. This section also provides a detailed 
discussion of the fmance discipline. Section four (STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE 
IN SALARIES) introduces stochastic dominance methods and applies them to the 
AACSB data. We modify these methods to develop other measures of salary 
differences between ranks. Section five offers our conclusions. 
DATA 
The AACSB has conducted salary surveys from member business schools since 
1968. The early salary surveys (1968-71) were more general data collection and 
reporting efforts. Beginning in 1972, member institutions reported detailed 
information that included means and standard deviations. These detailed surveys 
reports distinguished salary information by discipline, degree-granting level, 
enrollment and regional categories. 
With the 1977-78 survey, the AACSB changed the method by which it reported 
salary distributions, providing data on salaries at specific percentiles. The percentile 
breakdown reported maximum and minimum salaries as well as salary cutoffs for 
the 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 90% levels. The mean salaries continued to be 
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reported, but the standard deviations were dropped after 1978. Throughout the years 
since 1978, the AACSB continued to modify what information they collected. In 
1983, it introduced additional discipline distinctions-particularly the management 
discipline was further distinguished with organizational behavior and operations 
management distinctions. However, the basic format of the salary 
information-means and percentiles-remained the same, so these reports continued 
to provide a consistent series on annual academic compensation in business schools. 
As an accrediting body, the response rates to these surveys have always been 
high, typically above 90 percent for accredited schools and around SO percent for 
non-accredited schools. Table 1 shows that the majority of the overall response 
rates are between 70 to 80 percent and that the sample sizes are all large for the four 
institutional groupings: private versus public and accredited versus non-accredited. 
However, the lower response rates for non-accredited schools may introduce 
selectivity biases into our analysis. As such, we will only focus on the salary 
structure in accredited business schools. These response rates exceed the sample 
size requirements necessary to make reliable statistical statements and leave little 
concern for selectivity bias, as the number of non-respondents is unlikely to skew 
any results. 
The data that we analyze consists of 6,634 entries from the AACSB annual 
surveys conducted between 1979 and 2008 for the disciplines of accounting, 
economics, and fmance. The smallest unit of measurement in these surveys is the 
rank and hiring status of faculty. Specifically, the survey reports provide average 
and percentile information for existing instructors, assistant, associate and full 
professors, as well as new hires for each rank. These salary data are reported 
separately by discipline, institutional type (public or private) and accreditation 
status. Table 2 offers a picture of these data by summarizing of the mean, maximum 
and minimum salary averages across accredited schools for assistant, associate and 
full professors by discipline for the first, middle and a later year of the AACSB 
sample data. 
Table 2 reports salary data in $1,000s, which are not inflation adjusted. These 
data show substantial nominal salary growth rates in most business disciplines. For 
the entire 29-year period, salaries over all disciplines grew at a compound average 
of 5. 7% per year. As CPI inflation over this period averaged 3.8% per year, real 
wage growth was about 2.0% per year. Slightly less favorable conditions prevailed 
in the second half of our sample after 1992. Nominal salary growth averaged 3.9% 
per year and inflation averaged about 2.4% per year. 
ANALYSIS OF AVERAGES 
Our focus is on relative salary comparisons between ranks within a given 
discipline. We begin the analysis by investigating sample averages across the 
AACSB disciplines. The data in Table 2 provide our frrst look at salary inversion 
cases in AACSB business schools. This table shows that assistant professors on 
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Table 1: Response Rates to AACSB Salary Surveys, 1983-2008 
This table reorts response rates and counts of business schools respondents. 
Responses Received From 
Accredited Non-accredited 
Overall Sample Response Response Total 
Year Response Size Private Public Rate Private Public Rate Faculty 
2008 57.9% 485 128 291 90.9% 29 37 17.5% 25,338 
2007 63.7% 491 123 288 91.9% 34 46 24.7% 26,768 
2006 73.6% 485 122 279 91.6% 40 100 63.3% 24,829 
2005 77.6% 510 123 278 95.5% 51 58 46.0% 25,922 
2004 80.2% 519 118 274 95.8% 59 68 53.4% 25,928 
2003 75.5% 494 109 264 94.9% 54 67 46.4% 25,089 
2002 71.6% 474 107 243 91.1% 54 70 44.6% 24,183 
2001 70.5% 464 99 242 90.2% 59 64 43.9% 23,367 
2000 69.5% 462 95 229 90.3% 59 79 45.1% 22,996 
1999 69.2% 460 93 224 91.4% 61 82 44.7% 23,110 
1998 62.6% 417 82 207 86.3% 57 71 38.7% 20,162 
1997 66.4% 442 81 197 87.7% 75 89 47.0% 21,355 
1996 69.6% 461 79 205 91.0% 81 96 50.6% 22,494 
1995 69.7% 467 80 192 89.8% 89 106 53.1% 22,738 
1994 71.1% 475 80 187 91.1% 100 108 55.5% 22,901 
1993 65.941/o 438 77 125 70.6% 114 122 62.3% 24,621 
1992 76.4% 511 80 178 95.2% 113 140 63.6% 24,305 
1991 72.5% 482 74 175 92.2% 104 129 50.0% 23,208 
1990 74.9% 495 76 169 94.6% 106 144 62.2% 23,898 
1989 76.9% 512 78 172 96.5% 108 154 64.4% 23,956 
1988 73.5% 483 67 169 93.7% 109 138 61.0% 22,129 
1987 67.2% 438 60 152 87.2% 85 141 55.3% 20,653 
1986 66.941/o 427 59 150 86.0% 83 135 55.3% 20,590 
1985 68.8% 436 62 150 88.0% 95 129 57.0% 20,058 
1984 73.2% 460 nr nr nr nr nr nr 20,602 
1983 65.6% 361 nr nr nr nr nr nr 16,557 
average earn more than associate professors in fmance during 2004-2005 academic 
year. This result also arises with a comparison of the median salaries in finance. No 
other discipline shows an average level inversion during 2004-2005 or in the two 
previous surveys. These data suggest that mean salary inversions are likely a limited 
more recent phenomenon in these three disciplines. To explore these results further, 
we examine the finance discipline in more detail, and then use similar methods for 
the other disciplines. 
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Table 2. AACSB Salau-y Comparisons for 1979. 1992 and 200:> 
This table reports salary data by discipline across all reporting AACSB member schools, combining accredited with non-accredited and public and private 
institutions. Data are shown for the beginning, midpoint and a late period in the AACSB sample. Panel A reports the salary averages, Panel B reports the 
salary medians and Panel C reports the salary maximums. All amounts are in $1,000 \VtthQUt inflation adjustments. 
SUIVey Year 1978-79 Surve~ Year lWl-92 Survey Year 2004-05 
Assistant Associate Full Assistant Associate Full Assistant Associate Full 
Disci Eline Professor Professor Professor Professor Professor Professor Proiessor Professor Professor 
Panel A: Avera£12 across All Business Schools 
Accounting 19.2 11.9 27.9 51.2 55.7 69.8 93.5 94.1 114.0 
Economics 17.6 21.9 27.6 42.1 47.7 63.2 71.5 76.0 104.: 
Finance 19.3 22.8 29.1 55.6 58.3 73.6 105.1 101.9 129.6 
Pa1tel B: Mediam across All Business Schools 
Accounting 22.5 25.5 31.5 56.4 59.1 68.5 91.7 91.9 105.0 
Economics 19.5 23.5 30.5 42.4 48.0 61.4 68.3 72.9 95.7 
Finance 21.5 25.5 31.5 57.8 59.1 70.0 101.3 95.1 115.6 
Panel C: Ma:cinmrn across All Business Schools 
Accounting 33.0 38.0 42.0 85.0 117.8 181.6 180.0 203.0 325.0 
Economics 26.0 32.0 42.0 79.0 92.0 152.9 150.0 200.0 306.8 
Finance 32.0 42.0 42.0 92.0 114.9 190.0 171.8 195.4 375:0 
A Closer Look at Finance Salaries 
Figures 1 and 2 provide graphs of average and maximum salary levels for the 
Finance discipline over our sample period. The data in both figures are for 
accredited business schools. Figure 1 shows salary information for private schools 
and Figure 2 shows the same information for public schools. 
The two graphs in each figure pair up assistant and associate professors and 
associate and full professors, respectively. The pairing for assistants and associates 
at both public and private schools show that average level salary inversions began 
at different periods for these two types of institutions. For private schools, average 
salary inversions in fmance began in 1999, but it was not until2002 that it arose in 
public schools. There may be many possible reasons for this three-year lag in 
competitiveness, such as budget constraints tied to state funding, a lack of incentives 
to be competitive in public schools, and a selectivity preference among the more 
talented new or existing assistant professors toward private institutions. 
Unfortunately, the AACSB data do not provide an opportunity to examine these 
various possibilities in detail. However, we can investigate the extent of these 
differences across the three business school disciplines. Specifically, we can say that 
the differences in salaries between public and private institutions are statistically 
different from zero at the 1% level with private institutions paying more on average 
for all ranks in fmance. A time-trend regression shows that that average salaries of 
assistant professors are increasing by approximately $78 per year ~-value = 0.07) 
more than average salaries of associate professors at private schools. This estimate 
is $51 per year for public schools, but the time trend coefficient is not statistically 
significant for the public school sample. 
The data in Figures 1 and 2 also show that average salary inversions do not 
extend to a comparison between associate and full professors of fmance. The 
average salary difference is $12,800 between associate and full professors in public 
schools versus $25,300 in private schools. The public/private gap is greatest in the 
2005 survey, where the average associate-to-full salary difference is $28,000 for 
public schools and $46,300 for private schools. 
Figures 1 and 2 also confirm that associate/full professor salary gap is increasing 
over time. Similar to the results for assistant and associate professors, we estimated 
a time trend regression to determine the relative salary path for associate and full 
professors. This regression shows that the average change in the salary of associate 
professors is $855 per year (p-value = 0.003) lower than full professors in private 
business schools. This time trend coefficient shows a relative disadvantage of$311 
per year (p-value = 0.011) for public business schools. These results also show that 
salary relationships differ between private and public business schools, with private 
schools maintaining increasingly higher salaries for full professors. 
The differences between average salaries for associate and full professors of 
fmance suggestthat the variance ofthese salary distributions may be increasing over 
time, which may also be true for assistant professors. The increasing levels of the 
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Figure 1. Average and Maximum Salaries in Finance 
for AACSB-accreditated Private Business Schools 
This graph shows salary information in private schools for assistant and associate 
professors and associate and full professors respectively. 
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Figure 2. Average and Maximum Salaries in Finance 
for AACSB-accredited Public Business Schools 
This graph shows salary information in public schools for assistant and associate 
professors and associate and full professors respectively. 
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maximum salaries in Figures 1 and 2 also support this view. 
Salary Inversion by Discipline 
Table 3 provides a summary of mean level salary inversions for all years in our 
sample. All three disciplines-accounting, economics, and fmance---show evidence 
of salary inversion in private business schools, whereas accounting and finance also 
show evidence of salary inversion in public business schools. Across these groups, 
the average size of such inversions range from $500 in economics to $3,671 in 
fmance for private schools and from $300 in Accounting to $3,700 in fmance for 
public schools. 
Table 3 also shows that salary inversion is a recent phenomenon with the earliest 
case in finance in 1999. Most instances, however, began in 2002 or 2003, which 
means that overall salary inversion has affected business schools for only a few 
years. Although deans and department chairs must rationalize salary decisions to 
other administrators and possibly the faculty, these results show relatively small 
differences in compensation. Thus, the concern expressed by LeClair (2004) that 
salary inversion is widespread in business disciplines may be overstated. 
To determine whether these average salary differences are statistically 
significant, we conducted three tests: pairwise Student's t-test assuming unequal 
variances, Wilcoxon signed-rank test and the Mann-Whitney U-test, with the Mann-
Whitney U-test focused on whether the distributions between two ranks were 
identical. Table 4 reports the results of these tests for all disciplines with AACSB-
accredited private and public schools analyzed separately. Table 4 reports the p-
values for each test. 
If deans and department chairs are treating the different ranks as increasing in 
value from junior to senior levels, then we would expect to fmd significant 
differences between these salary comparisons. This result arises most strongly for 
associate and full professor comparisons. In every discipline and for private and 
public schools, average salaries are statistically greater for full professors than 
associate professors. This result is not compelling for salary comparisons between 
assistant and associate professors. The Student's t-test and Mann-Whitney U-test 
show a lack of significance for every discipline except Accounting in public 
business schools. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows a different set of results. 
With this test, only the finance discipline in private business schools has no 
statistically significant difference between average salaries for assistant and 
associate professors. This test may lack power compared to the Student's t-test, 
particularly the assumption that the data are from two related samples may not be 
valid in these comparisons. The general import of these results is that we will now 
focus our remaining analysis on the differences between assistant and associate 
professors because it appears that there are demonstrative differences between 
associate and full professor ranks. 
10 Journal of Financial Education 
~ 
~ s· 
~ ., 
t-.J 
:::: 
t-.J 
"""' 
"""' 
Table 3. Salary Inversions for Assistant versus Associate Professors by Discipline 
This table reports the years during which the average salary of assistant professors exceeded associate professors by discipline and by type of 
institution. The average difference in salaries is reported using only years where salaries are inverted. A positive number implies that assistant 
professors' average salary exceeding associate professors' average salary by that mean amount. 
Comparison Accounting Economics Finance Accounting Economics Finance 
.Inversion Years 
Average Salary Difference 
for Inversion Years 
Private AASCB-Accredited Business Schools 
2003-2005 2003-2005 1999-2005 
$2,000 $500 $3,671 
Public AACSB-Accredited Business Schools 
2004-2005 none 2002-2005 
$300 n.a. $3,700 
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Table 4. C'ompmison Test.~ for A'\'l"I'age Salmies by Df.<ldpline 
This table ~ the results of three statistical tests designed to determine if there are significant differences 
between salaries at lower and higher ranks. The Student's t-test compares means salaries assuming unequal 
·variances; the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test compares paired differences of salary averages; and the Mann-\v'hitney U 
test compares salary distributions. Data sho~'n in the table are p-values for one-tail t-tests and two-tail tests for the 
remaining statistics. The data are dh·ided by discipline and institutional type-private versus public--in Panels A 
and B. 
Wilcoxon Signed-
Student's t-test Rank Mann-\\"hitnei' U 
Assistant Assistant Assistant 
v. Associate v. Associate v . Associate 
Disci2line Associate v. Full Associate v.Full Associate v.Full 
Panel A: Private AASCB-A.ccredited Business Schools 
Accounting 0.357 0.009 0.003 0.000 0.335 0.012 
Economics 0.227 0.001 0.042 0.000 0.206 0.003 
Finance 0.403 0.005 0.264 0.000 0.365 0.009 
Panel B: Public AACSB-Accredited Business Schools 
Accounting 0.268 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.046 
Economics 0.090 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.005 
Finance 0.388 0.037 0.014 0.000 0.110 0.047 
show more similarity between the junior ranks than indicated by average 
comparisons, particularly for private business schools. In this section, we examine 
the relationship between assistant and associate ranks using stochastic dominance 
methods. We also adapt these methods to measure salary ranges of potential salary 
inversion and calculate a salary dissimilarity measure (SDM) to assess the degree 
of salary separation within the middle mass of assistant and associate cumulative 
salary distributions. 
Stochastic Dominance by Discipline 
We investigate the AACSB salazy distributions for evidence of first- and 
second-degree stochastic dominance.4 First-degree dominance implies that the 
salary distribution of a junior rank everywhere dominates that of a senior rank. In 
effect, the cumulative distribution function ofthe junior rank lies beneath that ofthe 
senior rank as measured across salaries. Second-degree dominance is less restrictive 
and is a consideration when the two cumulative distributions cross, possibly multiple 
times. Second-degree dominance requires a comparison of the areas between the 
two distributions over the entire range of salaries. These areas are compared at each 
salary level, and the junior rank distribution must prevail in area for every 
comparison for second degree dominance to hold. We follow the methods in Levy 
(2006), who provides details on how such comparisons are made using asset return 
distributions to construct optimal portfolios. 
As both first- and second-degree stochastic dominance imply mean level salary 
inversion, there are only a few years and disciplines that present the opportunity for 
either type of dominance by junior ranks. However, we can reverse the analysis to 
ask whether the associate rank shows evidence in its salary distribution of 
dominating the assistant rank. One may expect to fmd such dominance given the 
lack of salary inversion in most years and most disciplines. Table 5 presents the 
results ofthis analysis. 
Table 5 reports all cases of dominance in either direction of rank with results for 
both private and public business schools. An "Assoc" entry implies that Associate 
professors are both ftrSt- and second-degree dominant over assistants. When these 
two test results differ, the entry is marked with an"*", which implies that the first-
degree dominance relationship of associate over assistants is not determinant, but 
the second degree dominance relationship still holds. An "Asst" entry implies that 
Assistant professors are only second-degree dominant over Associate professors. 
A "No" implies that a first- or second-degree dominance relationship cannot be 
determined. These salary data show consistent dominance by associate professors 
over assistant professors in the early years of the AACSB salary surveys. For the 
six years, 1983 to 1988, 94.4% of the entries show ftrSt- or second-degree 
dominance by associate professors in private and public schools. The nine-year 
period at the end of our sample, 2000 to 2008, tells a different story. Now only 
11.1% of the entries show dominance by associate professors for private schools and 
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Table 5. Stochastic Dominance for Assistant and Associate Professors 
The aggregate salary distributions are compared for stochastic dominance for each survey 
year, 1979 to 2008 by discipline. All faculty are affiliated with AACSB-accredited business 
schools. An "Assoc" entry implies that associate professors are both first- and second-degree 
dominant over assistants. When these two tests differ, the entry is marked with an"*", which 
implies that the frrst-degree dominance relationship of associate over assistants is 
indeterminant, but the second-degree dominance relationship holds. An "Asst" entry implies 
that assistant professors are only second-degree dominant over associate professors. A "No" 
implies that a frrst- or second-degree dominance relationship cannot be determined. 
Year Accounting Economics Finance Accounting Economics Finance 
Private AACSB Accredited Public AACSB Accredited 
1979 Assoc As soc Assoc As soc Assoc Assoc 
1980 Assoc As soc Assoc Assoc Assoc As soc 
1981 Assoc Assoc As soc As soc Assoc As soc 
1982 Assoc As soc Assoc No No No 
1983 Assoc As soc As soc Assoc No As soc 
1984 Assoc Assoc Assoc As soc Assoc Assoc 
1985 Assoc Assoc No Assoc Assoc Assoc 
1986 Assoc As soc Assoc Assoc As soc As soc 
1987 As soc As soc Assoc As soc Assoc As soc 
1988 Assoc Assoc Assoc Assoc Assoc Assoc 
1989 No As soc Assoc As soc No No 
1990 As soc Assoc* No As soc Assoc* No 
1991 No No As soc* Assoc Assoc No 
1992 Assoc* No Assoc* As soc As soc Assoc* 
1993 No As soc Assoc No No Assoc* 
1994 Assoc Assoc No Assoc No Assoc* 
1995 No Assoc No As soc No Assoc* 
1996 Assoc Assoc Assoc* As soc No Assoc 
1997 Assoc Assoc Assoc* Assoc No As soc 
1998 Assoc Assoc Assoc* Assoc No Assoc* 
1999 No Assoc No No Assoc* Assoc* 
2000 No No No Assoc No No 
2001 No No No Assoc* Assoc Assoc* 
2002 No No No Assoc* Assoc No 
2003 No Assoc* No Assoc* As soc No 
2004 No No No No Assoc No 
2005 No No Asst* No Assoc No 
2006 No As soc* No A sst* As soc No 
2007 No Assoc* No No Assoc No 
2008 No No No No No No 
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only 44.4% show this dominance for public schools. The trend is that frrst- and 
second-degree dominance is more difficult to identify because assistant and 
associate salary distributions show more ranges in which salaries overlap, which 
rules out first-degree dominance. This trend holds for fmance and accounting but 
less so for economics. 
Ranges of Salary Overlap and the Salary Dissimilarity Measure (SDM) 
To gain a better sense of potential salary inversion, Table 6 reports the salary 
dissimilarity measure for assistant and associate professors in private and public 
business schools. The SDM is computed between two overlapping points on the 
cumulative salary distribution functions (CDFs) for associate and assistant 
professors. These points are identified as the lower and upper values of the 
probability range in Table 6. The overlapping salaries covered by this range are 
shown in the salary range column for each year and discipline. 
The SDM is computed as the ratio of the area under the assistant professor CDF 
relative to the area under the associate professor CDF, both defmed between the 
salary ranges shown in the table. An "n. a." in the tables implies that the distributions 
did not have a region with assistants dominating associates that represented at least 
10% of the CDF or did not have any overlapping points. Note that the SDM 
calculations start in 1999 in Table 6 because there were very few years in which we 
found regions in which assistants dominated associates prior to 1999. 
The SDM approaches unity as both distributions approach a prefect overlap 
between the specified salaries; as assistants increase their dominance of associates 
over the range, the SDM decreases. Because the CDFs ofthe two distributions start 
and end at the same probability, as the SDM decreases the assistants tend to become 
more concentrated at the higher salaries in the range. Thus, the measure shows how 
dissimilar salaries are within the range. 
As shown in Table 6, the overlapping regions cover between 10% and 76% of 
these salary distributions. The median coverage is 55.6% and the mean is 51.4% of 
these salary distributions. Given the relatively wide coverage, we consider this 
measure as applying to the "middle mass" of these distributions. 
The SDM results show a clear decrease in this measure from the upper 90% to 
the upper 80% levels in accounting for both private and public business schools. 
This suggests that the relative lack of dominance in Table 5 for accounting may only 
be a temporary phenomenon. The fmance discipline shows a dip in this measure 
from the upper to the lower 80% levels in the early years of the decade for private 
schools. The measure then returns to a lower 90% level implying a minimal change 
in the salary dissimilarity for assistant and associate professors in fmance at private 
schools during recent years. The public school SDM values for fmance tend to 
follow the accounting results: High 90% at the beginning and low 90% levels at the 
end of the decade. In contrast, the economics discipline suggests that assistant and 
associate salaries have become more similar over the past decade at private schools, 
FalVWinter 2012 15 
Table 6. Salary Dissimilarity Measure and Overlapping Salary Ranges 
This table shows distribution data for assistant and associate professors from 1999 to 2008 
employed at AACSB accredited business schools. The salary dissimilarity measure (SDM) 
is computed between two overlapping points on the cumulative salary distribution functions 
(CDFs) for associate and assistant professors. These points are identified as the lower and 
upper values of the probability range in the table. The overlapping salaries covered by this 
range are shown in the salary range column for each year and discipline. The SDM is 
computed as the ratio of the area under the assistant professor CDF relative to the area under 
the associate professor CDF, both defmed between the salary range shown. An "n.a." implies 
that the distributions did not have a region with assistants dominating associates that 
represented at least 10% of the CDF or did not have any overlapping points. The salary 
range is in $1,000. 
Discipline Probability Probability 
Year SDM Salary Ran_ge Range SDM Salary Range Range 
Private AACSB Accredited Public AACSB Accredited 
~ccounting: 
1999 98.10% 87.0-106.7 67.6%- 90.5% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2000 95.70% 88.4-117.8 65.3%- 91.9% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2001 92.80% 88.2-127.8 54.6% - 92.2% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2002 93.50% 90.7-142.4 51.8%- 92.91'/o 99.10% 100.0- 113.5 81.0%- 91.0% 
2003 93.60% 93.8- 166.4 51.6%-96.1% 98.10% 89.0- 117.9 58.8% - 90.8% 
2004 92.50% 90.0-165.6 37.91'/o- 94.6% 94.70% 84.9-130.0 46.8% - 92.8% 
2005 88.80% 91.1 -155.9 36.9%- 91.8% 95.80% 86.9-137.5 42.9% - 92.9% 
2006 89.70% 95.7- 167.1 38.7%- 92.8% 93.40% 81.7- 144.2 24.4%-93.1% 
2007 89.40% 92.8-164.8 28.0%- 90.6% 91.70% 83.0-148.7 19.4%-91.2% 
2008 89.60% 105.6- 178.2 34.5%- 90.9% 88.10% 87.8-168.9 15.7%- 91.9% 
Economics: 
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2000 90.90% 67.2-108.4 51.5%-93.9% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2001 86.80% 67.5-104.0 41.5% - 88.4% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2002 88.80% 68.7-122.9 39.0%- 95.0% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2003 92.30% 72.8-106.4 45.8%- 83.91'/o n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2004 88.30% 74.2-116.9 40.4%- 87.3% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2005 90.30% 74.3 -ll6.0 38.0%- 84.6% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2006 96.50% 78.3- 127.0 43.8%- 90.5% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2007 93.70% 84.7 -ll7.6 49.2% - 80.3% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008 99.00% 112.3 - 138.5 78.1%- 90.6% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Finance: 
1999 88.70% 74.5-113.9 30.1% - 88.3% 98.90% 80.9-99.9 66.6%- 89.91'/o 
2000 85.40% 75.9-123.9 25.5%- 88.3% 97.90% 93.4-109.0 63.3%- 90.9% 
2001 85.60% 81.2- 128.4 26.5%- 84.0% 95.60% 84.4-118.8 58.7%-91.9% 
2002 82.30% 80.5-136.7 21.6%- 87.91'/o 91.60% 77.6- 131.7 32.6%- 93.2% 
2003 82.10% 78.4-143.8 16.8%- 86.4% 89.20% 76.6-134.3 22.8%-91.7% 
2004 87.90% 83.2-147.0 17.6%-84.4% 89.00% 76.7- 140.7 19.1%-91.5% 
2005 86.30% 84.6-153.1 17.8%-85.4% 87.90% 77.4- 141.2 14.2%- 89.5% 
2006 93.60% 90.0-152.8 25.0%- 82.6% 91.50% 77.7-145.0 15.1%-89.7% 
2007 91.00% 97.0-161.0 27.0% - 82.2% 91.60% 87.9- 159.9 26.2%- 90.8% 
2008 92.60% 103.0- 173.4 23.3%- 81.3% 92.20% 95.4-167.2 19.7%-83.4% 
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which supports the view that salary inversions and salary dissimilarity are discipline 
specific, and not necessarily a widespread phenomenon. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of relative academic salaries is important to faculty and administrators 
for budgeting and the provision of incentives within business schools. Using 
AACSB salary survey data, we show that mean level salary inversion between 
assistant and associate professors is a recent fmding and occurs in fmance and 
accounting at private and public universities and in economics at private 
universities. By applying the method of stochastic dominance and a related SDM 
metric, we observe that there is possibly a trend towards increasing salary inversion 
in the upper salary range for the fmance and accounting disciplines. However, the 
opposite appears to hold for the economics discipline. 
ENDNOTES 
1Toutkoushian(1998),uses"levelofexperience"insteadofranktodefmesalary 
inversion. We will use the rank measure, as the level of experience is not available 
from the AACSB salary surveys. 
2 There is an extensive literature on the use of stochastic dominance in portfolio 
selection and decision-making under uncertainty. See Levy (2006) for 
comprehensive discussion of this literature and stochastic dominance theorems. 
This is the coefficient on the time trend variable in a regression adjusted for 
first-order serial correlation and estimated over the entire sample period. The p-
value of this estimated coefficient is 0.072 and the adjusted R-squared is 0.87. The 
dependent variable is the difference in average salary between assistant and 
associate professors. 
4 We do not compute third-degree stochastic dominance results, although they 
may be derived from the AACSB data. 
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